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Performance Bonds, Bankers' Guarantees,
and the Mareva Injunction
I.

INTRODUCTION

Performance bonds and bankers' guarantees' are common features
of international sales and construction contracts.2 They figure prominently in contracts with buyers and employers in the Middle East.' In
recent years, the amounts represented by these instruments have grown
so large that banks have begun to syndicate them in order to limit the
exposure of any one bank.4 With so much at stake, it is imperative that
traders, bankers, and lawyers understand the legal implications of performance bonds and bankers' guarantee agreements and the treatment of
such agreements by the courts. This Comment will address some of the
problems associated with performance bonds and bankers' guarantees in
international trade and the response of the English courts to these
problems. In particular, it will discuss the means by which payment of a
performance bond may be stopped or impeded under English law, focusing especially on the use of the Mareva injunction in the context of an
alleged fraudulent demand on the bond or guarantee.
1 Throughout this Comment the terms "performance bond" and "bank" or "bankers' guarantee" are used interchangeably. There is no real distinction for the purposes of the legal analysis to
follow, and English courts have tended to use the terms interchangeably. See United Trading Corp.
S.A. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd., (C.A. July 17, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file)
(term "performance bond" used throughout by Lord Justice Ackner to refer to "unconditional bank
guarantee" in contract). For an attempted distinction between performance bonds and bankers'
guarantees, see White, Banker's Guarantees and the Problem of Unfair Calling, 11 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 121, 123-26 (1979).
2 See Penn, Performance Bonds: Are Bankers Free From the Underlying Contract?, 1985
LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 132; Edwards, The Role of Bank Guaranteesin InternationalTrade, 56
Aus'rL. L.J. 281 (1982); and White, supra note 1.
3 See R.D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 146, 150
(1977). See also Gnitchel, The Intricaciesof PerformanceGuaranteesin SaudiArabia, 100 BANKING
L.J. 354 (1983).
4 See Kronfol, The Syndication of Risk in Unconditional Bonds, 1984 J. Bus. L. 13.

380

Bankers' Guarantees
7:380(1985)

II.

A SIMPLE HYPOTHETICAL

A useful introduction to the problems of performance bonds in in-

ternational trade is to imagine a simple hypothetical contract between an
employer in Saudi Arabia and an English construction company. Typically, the Saudi party will have more bargaining power than the English
party, who might need the business, and therefore might agree more

readily to the Saudi's terms.5 To insure performance of the contract, the
Saudi party will undoubtedly require the English party to obtain a performance bond or bankers' guarantee in the amount of at least five or ten
percent of the contract price.6
The English party will go to a bank and request that a bond or guarantee in the requisite amount be arranged in favor of the Saudi party.
The bank will no doubt request a promise of indemnification from the
English party for the amount of the bond in the event it is paid out.7 If
the amount of the bond is so large that the bank does not want to risk the
exposure alone, it may arrange for the syndication of the bond with other
banks.
5 Edwards says, "[t]hese on-demand performance guarantees are virtually imposed on the exporters by powerful importers who have the whip hand in negotiations. Exporters are usually faced
with a take or leave it attitude and reluctantly agree to the on-demand guarantee as part of the deal."
Edwards, supra note 2, at 284. Penn notes that "[i]n the early 1970s... recession in the home
markets forced British suppliers and contractors to look to new outlets for additional business; often
in markets where performance and other bonds were required if business was to be won." Penn,
supra note 2, at 132.
6 Macdonald, Construction Guarantees in SaudiArabia, INT'L FIN. L. REv., July 1982, at 22,
23. Macdonald states that:
[i]n the private sector, it is usual for an unconditional performance bank guarantee to be 10 per
cent of the value of the works whereas in the public sector, article VII of the Saudi procurement
law requires afinaldeposit of five per cent of the value of the contract in all contracts other than
direct purchase, consultant contracts or the purchase of spare parts for which no deposit is
required.
Id.
7 See Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 149. Justice Kerr stated that:
[a]ll the contracts provided that the plaintiffs were to establish a guarantee confirmed by a bank
of 5 per cent. of the price in favour of the buyers. These were in effect to be performance bonds.
They were called guarantees simpliciter, but their purpose was to provide security to the buyers
for the fulfilment by the plaintiffs of their obligations under the contracts. They were to be
established with the respective Egyptian banks. The machinery was that the plaintiffs instructed the bank to confirm the guarantees to the respective Egyptian bank, which therefore
became the bank's correspondent in Egypt for this purpose. The Egyptian banks in turn confirmed the guarantees to the buyers. The guarantees were backed by counter-indemnities by the
plaintiffs to the bank. The plaintiffs agreed to indemnify the bank in the widest terms and gave
authority for payment under the guarantees and to debit the plaintiffs' account accordingly.
Id.
8 Kronfol states that "contractors in the past few years. . . [have resorted] to the syndication
technique as an efficient method in dealing with such bonds whose size has grown to a point where it
. . . [has become] almost impossible for any one bank to take a huge exposure all on its own."
Kronfol, supra note 4, at 13.
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It is quite probable that the performance bond or guarantee issued
by the English party's bank will be of the "demand" or "unconditional"
type.9 Generally, this will mean that the Saudi party may request payment in the amount of the bond by simply making a demand to the appropriate bank at any time prior to the expiration date of the bond,
regardless of whether the English party has actually performed under the
contract.10 Unless the bank knows that the demand on the bond is fraud12
ulent,1 1 the bank will have little choice but to pay out on the bond.
9 Macdonald states that:
[e]mployers do not favor surety bonds or conditional guarantees as, by their terms, they require
proof of default and thus justification of a claim under a bond or guarantee. The norm is still
for unconditional guarantees ....
There ... is no trend in the direction of Saudi employers
accepting conditional guarantees or surety bonds."
Macdonald, supra note 6, at 22-23.
10 See State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd. (C.A. July 17, 1981)
(available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (statement of Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls,
that.
performance bonds fulfil a most useful role in international trade. If the seller defaults in making delivery, the buyer can operate the bond. He does not have to go to far away countries and
sue for damages, or go through a long arbitration. He can get damages at once which are due to
him for breach of contract. The bond is given so that, on notice of default being given, the
buyer can have his money in hand to meet his claim for damages for the seller's non-performance of contract).
See also Edward Owen Eng'g Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 168 (1977).
11 This is the well-known "fraud exception" or "fraud rule" best summed up by the maxim
"fraud unravels all" which English courts borrowed from cases involving irrevocable letters of credit
for use in cases involving demand performance bonds or bank guarantees. See United City
Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1982] 2 All E.R. 720. In Edward Owen,
Lord Denning, M.R., cited the United States case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177
Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), for the proposition that "the bank ought not to
pay under the credit if it knows that the documents are forged or that the request for payment is
made fraudulently in circumstances when there is no right to payment." Edward Owen, [1978] 1
Q.B. at 169. For the general rule that when an irrevocable letter of credit is issued and confirmed by
a bank, the bank must pay if the documents conform to the terms of the letter of credit agreement,
see Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Indus. Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 129 (1957) (statement of
Lord Justice Jenkins that: "the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between
the banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes upon the banker an absolute obligation to
pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between the parties .... ). In United Trading Corp.,
supra note I, Ackner, L.J., stated, with respect to the relevant date for establishing the bank's knowledge of fraud, that:
[W]here payment has in fact been made, the bank's knowledge that the demand made by the
beneficiary on the performance bond was fraudulent must exist prior to the actual payment to
the beneficiary and that its knowledge at that date must be proved. Accordingly, if all a plaintiff
can establish is such knowledge after payment, then he has failed to establish his cause of action.
The bank would not have been in breach of duty in making the payment without the requisite
knowledge.
Id. But cf Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 170-71 (statement of Lord Denning, M.R., that "the
banks will rarely, if ever, be in a position to know whether the demand is honest or not. At any rate
they will not be able to prove it to be dishonest. So they will have to pay.").
12 From the bank's point of view, it is in its best interest to pay out on the bond even in suspect
circumstances in order to preserve its good name and reputation in international commerce. In
Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 151, Kerr, J., stated that the bank's "reputation depends on strict compli-
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While the English party may have agreed to such an arrangement, included the amount of the bond in the contract price, and perhaps even
insured against the risk of a demand on the bond, 13 it seems inequitable
that the Saudi party should be allowed to call on the bond with such
impunity, particularly if performance is only beginning or has already
taken place.14 Nonetheless, there are persuasive reasons for allowing
banks to make payments of performance bonds even in suspect circumstances.' 5 Here, the question is whether the English party may prevent
ance with its obligations. This has always been an essential feature of banking practice." In
Bolivinter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [1984 1 Lloyd's L.R. 251, 257 (1983), Sir John
Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, stated that "[i]f... [the customer] is to be allowed to derogate from
the bank's personal and irrevocable undertaking... he will undermine what is the bank's greatest
asset... namely its reputation for financial and contractual probity."
13 The alternative of including the amount of the bond in the contract price is suggested by both
Lord Denning, M.R., and Lord Justice Lane in Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 170, 176. It is
submitted that this may not always be possible. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 285. In regard to the
insurance alternative, Edwards notes that:
Most countries have State institutions which should provide insurance cover against the arbitrary calling on an on-demand guarantee, that is, without justification and there being no fault
on the part of the seller. Most of these government agencies-for example, the Canadian Export Development Corporation, British Export Credit Guarantee Department, Australian Export Finance and Insurance Corporation-also provide insurance against abusive drawing of a
stand-by letter of credit issued in lieu of an on-demand guarantee. Such insurance usually
presupposes the existence of an export contract and would not, as was the situation with the
Edward Owen case... provide any cover if the export contract has not been established.
Edwards, supra note 2, at 285.
14 See Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 166 (Libyan party called on bond before Edward Owen
had an opportunity to perform); United Trading Corp., supra note I (performance bonds demanded
by Iraqi government concern, Agromark, after certain contracts had already been performed).
15 The oft-cited rationale for English courts' unwillingness to stop payments of performance
bonds and bank guarantees even in admittedly suspect circumstances was first articulated by Kerr,
J., in Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 155-56. Kerr, J., said that:
It is only in exceptional cases that the courts will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable
obligations assumed by banks. They are the life-blood of international commerce. Such obligations are regarded as collateral to the underlying rights and obligations between the merchants
at either end of the banking chain. Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks
have notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by
litigation or arbitration as available to them or stipulated in the contracts. The courts are not
concerned with their difficulties to enforce such claims; these are risks which the merchants
take. In this case, the plaintiffs took the risk of the unconditional wording of the guarantees.
The machinery and commitments of banks are on a different level. They must be allowed to be
honoured, free from interference by the courts. Otherwise, trust in international commerce
could be irreparably damaged.
Id. For similar statements of this view, see Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1975] 1
W.L.R. 315, 320 (1974) (statement of Justice Megarry that he "would be slow to interfere with
bankers' irrevocable credits, and not in the least in the sphere of international banking unless a
sufficiently grave cause is shown; for interventions by the court that are too ready or too frequent
might gravely impair the reliance which, quite properly, is placed on such credits"); ED & FMan
(Sugar) Ltd., supra note 10 (statement by Lord Denning, M.R., that "performance bonds fulfil a
most useful role in international trade"); Intraco Ltd. v. Notis Shipping Corp. (The "Bhoja
Trader"), [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 256, 257 (statement of Lord Justice Donaldson that "[t]hrombosis
will occur if, unless fraud is involved, the Courts intervene and thereby disturb the mercantile practice of treating rights thereunder as being the equivalent of cash in hand"); and Bolivinter Oil, [1984]
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the payment of the bond to the foreign party after an allegedly fraudulent
demand has been made.
III.

THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS

Performance bonds and bankers' guarantees have often been
equated with and compared to irrevocable letters of credit commonly
used in international trade. 16 In some instances, particularly under
United States law, the so-called performance bond or bankers' guarantee
is, in fact, a type of letter of credit.' 7 Thus, it is not entirely surprising
that letter of credit law has been applied with some regularity to cases
involving performance bonds.18
In dealing with parties seeking to enjoin payment of a demand bond
or bank guarantee, English courts have almost uniformly compared such
instruments to the irrevocable or confirmed letter of credit.19 The courts
have held that, as with the irrevocable letter of credit, the establishment
of an unconditional performance bond or bank guarantee by the seller in
favor of the buyer constitutes a contract between the seller and the
1 Lloyd's L.R. at 257 (statement of Sir John Donaldson, M.R., that: "the value of all irrevocable
letters of credit and performance bonds and guarantees will be undermined," if the courts interfere
too frequently with their payment). For a contrary view, see United Trading Corp., supra note 1
(statement of Ackner, L.J., that the strength of the proposition that to delay payment under letters of
credit and performance bonds strikes not only at the proper workings of international commerce but
also at the reputation and standing of the international banking community "can be
overemphasized.").
16 See Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. 146; Howe Richardson Scale Co. Ltd. v. Polimex-Cekop, [1978]
1 Lloyd's L.R. 161 (1977); Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. 159; and Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's
L.R. 251. But see Potton Homes Ltd. v. Coleman Contractors Ltd. (C.A. Feb. 24, 1984) (available
on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (statement by Lord Justice Eveleigh that he did not regard
Lord Denning, M.R., in Edward Owen "as saying that one should approach every case upon the
basis that the bond is a letter of credit and to have no regard to the circumstances which brought it
into existence.").
17 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(a) (1985); Federal
Reserve Board Conditions of Membership of State Banks, 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(1) (1986). See also
Potton Homes, supra note 16. In Potton Homes, Eveleigh, L.J., noted that:
References to the similarity to a letter of credit.., are to be expected in the American courts
where banks have adapted the letter of credit (calling it a standby letter of credit) to take the
place of a performance bond.
Id. Macdonald states that "[b]anks in the United States issue a letter of credit in lieu of a guarantee
as US [sic] law prohibits U.S. banks to issue guarantees as such. Such a letter of credit operates in
substance like a guarantee as it is a contractual undertaking of the bank to pay. Such letters of credit
are often referred to as standby letters of credit." Macdonald, supra note 6, at 22 n. 1 (emphasis in
original). Note, however, that foreign branches of United States banks which are members of the
Federal Reserve System and Edge and Agreement corporations may issue guarantees subject to
certain limitations. See International Operations of United States Banking Organizations, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 211.3(b)(1), 211.4(e)(iv) (1986).
18 See supra note 16.
19 Id.
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seller's banker that is separate and distinct from the contract of sale between the seller and the buyer.2'

The performance bond agreement or

contract between the seller and the seller's banker imposes upon the
banker the absolute obligation to pay the bond in the event of a demand,

irrespective of any' dispute there may be between the buyer and seller
with regard to the performance of the contract. 2 1

If the contract involves parties in different countries, the seller's
bank will generally arrange for a bank in the buyer's country to pay the

bond or guarantee in the requisite amount upon demand.2 2 The seller's
bank will promise to indemnify the foreign bank in the event payment of
the bond is demanded. The foreign bank will "confirm" or promise to
pay the buyer the amount of the bond on demand.23 Consequently there
are contracts between the parties and their respective banks and con-

tracts between the banks themselves which are on a completely different
20 See Hamzeh Malas, [1958] 2 Q.B. at 129 (statement of Jenkins, L.J., that: "the opening of a
confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods,
which imposes upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may
be between the parties as to whether the goods are up to contract or not."); Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B.
at 156 (statement of Kerr, J., that: "[blanks are not concerned with the rights or wrongs of the
underlying disputes but only with the performance of the obligations which they themselves have
confirmed."); Howe Richardson, [1978] 2 Lloyd's L.R. at 165 (statement of Lord Justice Roskill that:
Whether the obligation arises under a letter of credit or under a guarantee, the obligation of the
bank is to perform that which it is required to perform by that particular contract, and that
obligation does not in the ordinary way depend on the correct resolution of a dispute as to the
sufficiency of performance by the seller to the buyer or by the buyer to the seller as the case may
be under the sale and purchase contract; the bank here is simply concerned to see whether the
event has happened upon which its obligation to pay has arisen);
and Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 169 (statement of Lord Denning, M.R., that:
A performance bond. . . has many similarities to a letter of credit ....
It has been long
established that when a letter of credit is issued and confirmed by a bank, the bank must pay it if
the documents are in order and the terms of the credit are satisfied. Any dispute between [the
parties] must be settled between themselves).
21 See itd
22 See Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 149 (performance bonds established by plaintiff sellers'
London bank with Egyptian banks); Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 166 (plaintiff suppliers' London
bank established performance bond with Libyan bank); and Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at
257 (plaintiff oil company's London bank gave a letter of credit to a Syrian bank which established a
guarantee in favor of the defendant oil refinery).
23 In Edward Owen, Barclays asked the Libyan bank to issue a performance bond in favor of the
Libyan buyers. When asked by the Libyan bank to "confirm that you will pay total or part of said
guarantee on first of our demand without any conditions or proof... " Barclays replied to the
Libyan bank: "We confirm our guarantee... payable on demand without proof or conditions." The
guarantee issued to the Libyan buyers by the Libyan bank stated:
[c]onsidering the fact that the contract relating to this transaction calls for the issue of a bank
guarantee for an amount of £50,203 ... We, the undersigned, guarantee to you the firm "Edward Owen" to the extent of the above mentioned amount and it is understood that the said
amount will be paid on your first demand, which must reach us within the period of validity of
the letter of guarantee. This guarantee is valid until August 31, 1978, after which its validity
will expire and the letter of guarantee will have to be returned to this bank.
Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 166-67.
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level from the underlying contract of sale between the buyer and the
seller.2 4

As with the irrevocable letter of credit, English courts will not enjoin payment of a demand bond or bank guarantee unless the party seeking the injunction can show that the demand on the bond or guarantee is
fraudulent and that the bank knew it to be fraudulent.2 5 The difficulty
for the plaintiff lies in proving this knowledge of fraud on the part of the
bank.2 6 Unlike some United States courts, English courts will not, at
present, enjoin payment of an irrevocable letter of credit or demand bond
or bank guarantee upon a mere suspicion of fraud.27
24 See Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 156 (statement of Kerr, J., that the "machinery and committments of banks are on a different level" from the underlying contracts of merchants).
25 See supra note 11. But cf. ED & F Man (Sugar)Ltd., supra note 10 (statement of Lord
Denning, M.R., that the only implied term:
to be imported [into the performance bond agreement] is that the buyer, when giving notice of
default, must honestly believe that there has been a default on the part of the seller. Honest
belief is enough. If there is no honest belief it may be evidence of fraud. If there is sufficient
evidence of fraud, the court might intervene and grant an injunction. But otherwise not. So
long as the buyer honestly believes there is a default on the part of the seller, that is sufficient
ground for notice of default to be given.)
Id. (emphasis added). Lord Denning, M.R., did not make clear whether a bank's knowledge of a
buyer's lack of honest belief was sufficient for the bank to legitimately refuse payment of the performance bond or whether the seller attempting to enjoin payment of the bond could attempt to
show that the bank had knowledge of the buyer's lack of honest belief. It is possible Lord Denning,
M.R., was alluding to a statement he made in Edward Owen that "so long as the... customers make
an honest demand, the banks are bound to pay .... " Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 170-71
(emphasis added). In Dodsal PVT Ltd. v. Kingpull Ltd. (C.A. July 1, 1985) (available on LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file), Lord Justice Neill distinguished between fraud and lack of honest belief,
stating that in the line of cases extending from Hamzeh Malas through United Trading Corp.:
the grounds upon which the court has contemplated that an injunction could be granted appear
to have been limited to knowledge offraud or lack of honest belief. There may ... be cases
where no injunction could be granted against a bank because they had no reason to know of, or
even suspect, any fraudulent conduct but where relief could be obtained against the beneficiary
whose lack of honest belief in his right to make a claim could be clearly demonstrated. But the
cases show that in the absence of badfaith, the bond or guarantee will be enforced.
Id. (emphasis added). Presumably "bad faith" is equivalent to fraud or lack of honest belief in this
context, though arguments could certainly be made that "bad faith" is a lesser standard. It is clear
that mere breach of contract by the party calling on the bond or guarantee does not constitute fraud
for the purposes of the fraud exception. See Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 168; supra note 20
(bank's obligations independent of the underlying contract between buyer and seller and any disputes between buyer and seller). In United Trading Corp., supra note 1, Ackner, L.J., noted in the
course of his discussion of the United States performance bond rules that the United States conception of fraud is far wider than the United Kingdom's and "would appear to include ordinary breach
of contract."
26 See United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
27 See id. (By noting that in the United States "a temporary restraining order is made essentially
on the basis of suspicion of fraud," Ackner, L.J., implicitly suggested that such an order was not
available upon a mere suspicion of fraud under English law).
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A. The Edward Owen Case
The leading English case in the field of performance bonds is Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank InternationalLtd.,28 in
which Lord Denning, M.R., laid the foundations for virtually all performance bond law. Called the "locus classicus" of performance bond
law, Edward Owen established the strict application of the fraud rule to
performance bond cases, a rule which has been followed with little variance to date.2 9
Edward Owen involved a contract between the Agricultural Development Council of Libya and an English concern, Edward Owen Engineering Ltd., for the construction of a number of large greenhouses in
Libya.3" The parties agreed that Libyan law would govern the contract
and that any disputes between the parties would be taken up in a Libyan
court.3

As a precondition to the making of any contract, the Libyan party
demanded a performance guarantee from Edward Owen in the amount
of ten percent of the final contract price, which was to remain valid up
until the final delivery date. 32 Edward Owen instructed its English bankers, Barclays, to arrange for a performance bond in the requisite amount.
Barclays then asked the Libyan bank to issue the guarantee in favor of
the Libyan party.3 3 Later, Barclays confirmed via telex to the Libyan
bank that the guarantee was "payable on demand without proof or conditions.",34 Barclays, of course, obtained an indemnity agreement from
Edward Owen guaranteeing that Owen would pay the amount of the
bond in the event it was called on by the Libyans.35
Under the terms of the contract, the Libyans were to arrange for a
confirmed letter of credit in favor of Edward Owen for the payment of
28 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159.
29 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
30 Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 164.
31 Id This is not at all uncommon in international contracts involving performance bonds. See
United Trading Corp., supra note I (Iraqi law governed the contracts and any disputes between the
parties were to be taken up in Iraqi courts).
32 Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 166.
33 Id.
34 See supra note 23.
35 The indemnity agreement signed by Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. stated that:
In consideration of your procuring the giving by Barclays Bank International Ltd. of a...
guarantee... we... agree to keep you indemnified... and ...irrevocably authorise you to
make any payments and comply with any demands which may be claimed or made under the
said... guarantee ...and agree that any payment which you shall make... shall be binding
upon... us and shall be accepted by... us as conclusive evidence that you were liable to make
such payment or comply with such demand.
Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 167.
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the contract price. The Libyans issued a letter of credit but it was not the
confirmed letter of credit required by the contract. After several months
of fruitless negotiations conducted by Edward Owen with the purpose of
persuading the Libyans to amend the letter of credit, Edward Owen
wrote to the Libyans, stating that "[s]ince the letter of credit is not operative, it obviously follows that our guarantee has no effect." 36 Notwithstanding the fact that they were in default, the Libyans, upon receiving
the foregoing notice from Edward Owen, demanded payment of the performance bond from the Libyan bank. Relying on the guarantee agreement and telexed confirmation, the Libyan bank then demanded
payment from Barclays.37

Upon hearing of the demand on the performance bond by the Libyans, Edward Owen sought and obtained a High Court injunction against
Barclays, restraining Barclays from paying the Libyan bank the amount
of the bond.3 8 Barclays succeeded in its application to have the injunction
lifted. Edward Owen then appealed, asking for restoration of the injunction and claiming that they would have no remedy in the Libyan courts if
the English court allowed payment of the bond. The case was heard in
the Court of Appeal by Lord Denning, M.R., and Lord Justices Brown
and Lane.39
Lord Denning, M.R., called the performance bond "a new creature"
and compared it to the irrevocable letter of credit, citing the United
States letter of credit case, Sztejn v. J. Henry SchroderBanking Corporation," for the proposition that "the bank ought not to pay under the
credit if it knows that the documents are forged or that the request for
payment is made fraudulently in circumstances where there is no right to
36 Id. at 165. This would appear to have been a significant strategic mistake on the part of
Edward Owen because it prompted the Libyan party to immediately call on the bond.
37 Id. at 168.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 159.

40 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). Sztejn involved the issuance of an
irrevocable letter of credit by Schroder in favour of Transea Traders Ltd. of Lucknow, India for the
purchase of bristles by the plaintiffs, Sztejn and Schwarz. Transea, however, filled fifty crates with
cowhair and other rubbish in an attempt to deceive Sztejn and Schwarz. Transea then drew a draft
on the letter of credit to the order of Schroder's Indian correspondent bank, which presented the
draft and accompanying documents to Schroder for payment. After discovering Transea's attempted fraud, Sztejn and Schwarz brought an action to restrain payment of the drafts under the
letter of credit issued by Schroder. Justice Sheintag granted the injunction, stating that "where the
seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and documents have been
presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller." Id. at 634. For a more complete
treatment of Sztejn, see HARFIELD, LErrERS OF CREDIT 81-85 (1979).
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payment."4 1 Lord Denning, M.R., stated that:
A bank which gives a performance guarantee must honour that guarantee
according to its terms. It is not concerned in the least with the relations
between the supplier and the customer; nor with the question whether the
supplier has performed his contracted obligation or not; nor with the question whether the supplier is in default or not. The bank must pay according
to its guarantee, on demand if so stipulated, without proof or conditions.
The only
exception is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has
42
notice.
Without explicitly addressing the question of whether the Libyan demand was fraudulent, Lord Denning, M.R., held that the injunction
must be discharged and Barclays allowed to pay the amount of the bond
to the Libyan bank.4 3

B.

The Bolivinter Oil Case

The Court of Appeal has had several occasions to reexamine Edward Owen and elaborate on the principles set forth by Lord Denning,
M.R." While it has remained a somewhat controversial case among
commentators, 45 Edward Owen has, for the most part, been followed
faithfully by the Court of Appeal. 6 Sir John Donaldson, M.R., strongly
reaffirmed the principles of Edward Owen in the case of Bolivinter Oil
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank.47
Bolivinter Oil involved a performance guarantee given by Bolivinter
in favor of Homs, a Syrian refinery. Bolivinter gave a cash deposit to
Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase") as an indemnity for a letter of credit
Chase issued to the Commercial Bank of Syria ("CBS") in the amount of
the guarantee. CBS then issued the guarantee to Homs.4 8 After a
number of disputes between Bolivinter and Homs during the course of
performance, the parties reached an alleged settlement agreement provid41 Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 169.
42 Id. at 171.
43 Id

at 172.

44 See ED & FMan (Sugar)Ltd., supra note 10; Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 251; Potton
Homes, supra note 16; United Trading Corp., supra note 1; Dodsal PVT, supra note 25; and Esal
(Commodities) Ltd. v. Oriental Credit Ltd. (C.A. July 31, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Enggen, Li-

brary, Cases file).
45 Professor C.M. Schmitthoff stated that Edward Owen was "wrongly decided." See Schmitthoff, Export Trade: Bank's Liability under Unconditional PerformanceBond, 1977 J. Bus. L. 351,

353. But see White, supra note 2, at 129 (Schmitthoff's view of Edward Owen "commands much
respect; but it seems unlikely to be followed.").
46 See supra note 44.
47 [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 251 (1983). It is interesting to note that in the Bhoja Trader, [1981] 2
Lloyd's L.R. 256, Donaldson, L.J., did not once refer to Edward Owen in his judgment despite the
fact that the Bhoja Trader involved the attempted injunction of a bank guarantee.
48 Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 252-53.
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ing that the performance guarantee would be released by Horns upon the
arrival of the last of Bolivinter's vessels carrying oil to Syria. 49 In apparent reliance on this agreement, Bolivinter notified Chase of the release of
the performance guarantee. Chase sought confirmation from CBS that
the guarantee had been cancelled. CBS informed Chase that Horns had
demanded payment of one million dollars under the CBS guarantee and
that CBS was claiming one million dollars indemnification under the letter of credit issued by Chase in CBS's favor."0
Upon hearing of the claim and before payment could be made,
Bolivinter obtained a Commercial Court injunction restraining Horns
from claiming the CBS guarantee or claiming the $1 million under the
Chase letter of credit and restraining Chase from paying on the letter of
credit. After a further hearing, the court held that the injunctions
against Chase and CBS should be discharged. However, the court allowed the injunctions to remain in place until Bolivinter could appeal.5 1
After quoting extensively from Edward Owen 52 and the letter of
credit case United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of
Canada,53 Sir John Donaldson, M.R., addressed the question of "the relevant time at which the state of knowledge of the guarantor, or issuer of
the letter of credit, fell to be considered," pointing out that in the instant
case Chase and CBS knew more after the matter had been investigated by
the court than when CBS first demanded payment.5 4 Donaldson, M.R.,
however, avoided answering the question as to what time the knowledge
of the bank as to fraud should be considered. Instead he concluded that
it was
clearly debatable whether Horns . . .acted fraudulently in making their

claim on the CBS guarantee or whether they... merely acted in breach of
their release agreement with Bolivinter.... Such knowledge is quite insufficient to justify a Court in preventing Chase and CBS complying with their
55
contractual obligations ....
The Court of Appeal dismissed Bolivinter's appeal and lifted the injunctions against CBS and Chase, but not the injunction against Horns, because Horns had not requested that the injunction be discharged.
Nevertheless, Donaldson, M.R., noted that "nothing in the injunction
49 Id. at 253.
50 Id. at 254.
51 Id.
52 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159.
53 [1982] 2 All E.R. 720.
54 Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 256.
55 Id. This statement by Donaldson, M.R., lends support to the conclusion that there is a distinction for the purposes of the fraud exception between breach of contract and fraud on the part of the
beneficiary of the performance bond or bank guarantee. See supra note 26.
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against Horns is in any way to inhibit the freedom of CBS to make
payment in accordance with its contractual obligations under the performance guarantee," 5 6 thus effectively allowing Horns to obtain payment under the guarantee despite the injunction. This outcome and the
stress Donaldson, M.R., laid on the fact that very clear evidence is required-"both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge" 5 7
in order for the court to grant an injunction against a performance bond
princior bank guarantee-strongly reinforced the strict fraud exception
5 8
Owen.
Edward
in
M.R.,
Denning,
Lord
by
ples established
...

C. The Potton Homes Case
Despite the reaffirmation of the principles of Edward Owen in
Bolivinter Oil by Donaldson, M.R., Eveleigh, L.J., seemed to derogate
somewhat from the strict fraud exception of Edward Owen 59 in Potton
Homes Ltd. v. Coleman ContractorsLtd.,6 which followed shortly after
Bolivinter Oil. However, the outcome of Potton Homes indicates that the
discussion by Eveleigh, L.J., of a more flexible fraud exception was mere
dicta.6 1
Both parties in Potton Homes were English companies. The plaintiffs had agreed to supply the defendants with prefabricated building
units for shipment to Libya. The plaintiff suppliers gave performance
bonds for each of the two contracts. A dispute arose between the parties
over moneys owed and alleged defects in the houses that had been delivered. The defendants made a demand on the performance bonds, but the
plaintiffs were able to obtain an interim injunction restraining the defendants from calling on the bonds.62
Eveleigh, L.J., considered the extent to which the performance bond
is to be regarded as independent of the underlying contract between the
buyer and the seller. He stated that "[w]hile from the point of view of
the bank the underlying contract is irrelevant and the bank's contract
with the seller is independent of it, non-the-less as between buyer and
seller the underlying contract may not be irrelevant.' 63 What Eveleigh,
56 Bolivinter Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 257.
57 Id.

58 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159. See supra note 11.
59 Id

60 See supra note 16.
61 Id. For the orthodox view that the bank's obligations are independent of the underlying contract between the buyer and the seller, see text accompanying notes 20-21. See also Schmitthoff,
Editorial. Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit, 1984 1 Bus. L. 106, 108.
62 Potten Homes, supra note 16.
63 See supra note 61.
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L.J., seemed to imply was that where the beneficiary of the performance
bond had breached the underlying contract with the seller or supplier,

the court might treat a call on the performance bond, in view of the
breach, as something akin to fraud; and therefore the court might be

willing to impose an injunction restraining the beneficiary from calling
on the bond or dealing with the proceeds."4 Such an approach differs
from the orthodox view that the underlying contract between the buyer
and the seller is separate and distinct from the obligation of the bank to
pay the amount of the bond or guarantee on demand notwithstanding

any disputes or claimed breaches of contract between the parties.65
The situation apparently contemplated by Eveleigh, L.J., would involve parties within the jurisdiction of the court who had agreed that
English law would govern the contract and that any dispute would be
settled in an English court.6 6 The parties need not be English, but the

paying bank would probably have to be within the court's jurisdiction.67
In such a case, if there were a dispute between the parties and one party
could claim lawful avoidance of the contract, then following language
from the judgment of Eveleigh, L.J., in Potton Homes, a court could treat
the performance bond as cash in hand and issue an injunction restraining
the defendant from demanding the bond or the bank from paying until
the case could be heard and the amount of damages, including the
amount represented by the bond, be determined.6 8
However, in Potton Homes, Eveleigh, L.J., held that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that they had not breached the contract and therefore
could lawfully avoid it. Thus, a demand on the bond by the defendants
64 Eveleigh, L.J., stated that:
As between buyer and seller the underlying contract cannot be disregarded so readily. If
the seller has lawfully avoided the contract prima facie, it seems to me he should be entitled to
restrain the buyer from making use of the performance bond. Moreover, in principle I do not
think it possible to say that in no circumstances whatsoever, apartfrom fraud, will the court
restrain the buyer. The facts of each case must be considered. If the contract is avoided or if
there is a failure of consideration between buyer and seller for which the seller undertook to
procure the issue of the performance bond, I do not see why, as between the seller and buyer,
the seller should not be unable to prevent a call upon the bond by the mere assertion that the
bond is to be treated as cash in hand.
Potton Homes, supra note 16 (emphasis added).
65 See supra note 61.
66 Unless the parties had agreed that English law would govern the contract and that any disputes would be settled in an English court, the court would presumably have no basis for determining whether or not consideration had failed or the contract had been breached. Cf Edward Owen,
(1978] 1 Q.B. 159.
67 See The Bhoja Trader, [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. at 258 (statement of Donaldson, L.J., that "payment in one country can be a very different matter from payment in another. .
68 See Potton Homes, supra note 16 (judgment of Eveleigh, L.J.).
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would not be fraudulent. 69 Eveleigh, L.J., also recognized that the purpose of the performance bond was to allow the defendants to obtain the
funds without establishing breaches of contract on the part of the plaintiffs. On this ground, Eveleigh, L.J., stated that he did not think "it right
for the court to order what would in effect be a variation of the terms of
the parties' agreement in relation to the bond."'7 0 The court denied the
injunction the plaintiffs sought and permitted the defendants to call on
the bonds. This outcome effectively limited the precedential value of the
discussion of the bond as cash in hand between the parties by Eveleigh,
L.J. It is submitted that this discussion may be safely regarded as dicta.7 1
D.

The United Trading Corporation Case

Following Potton Homes, the Court of Appeal handed down another
performance bond case, United Trading CorporationS.A. v. Allied Arab
Bank Ltd.,72 parts of which might be read as implying that the Court of
Appeal was contemplating a more flexible approach to the strict fraud
rule of Edward Owen. 73 As in Potton Homes, however, the Court of Appeal upheld the fraud rule in the end and the- plaintiffs failed in their
attempt to prevent payment of the performance bonds.74
United Trading Corporationinvolved nineteen contracts for the sale
of foodstuffs by a group of English traders to an Iraqi government concern, Agromark. The contracts were governed by Iraqi law and all disputes were to be submitted to Iraqi courts. However, the indemnity
agreements between the plaintiff sellers and their English banks were
subject to English law.75
69 Id. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the relationship between breach of contract and the
fraud exception.
70 PattonHomes, supra note 16.
71 Lord Justice May in his judgment in Patton Homes concurred with Eveleigh, L.J., that the
defendants were entitled to demand payment of the bond and that the bank must pay. Id. However,
he did so, not on the grounds of the discussion by Eveleigh, L.J., of the conduct of the parties, but on
the more orthodox grounds of the Harbottle,Howe Richardson, and Bhoja Trader cases. Professor
C.M. Schmitthoff has stated that:
The difference between Eveleigh, L.J. and May, L.J. [in Patton Homes] concerned a situation in
which a dispute arose between the seller and the buyer out of the underlying contract and this
dispute extended to the bond facility. Here Eveleigh, L.J. was prepared to admit certain
defences arising from the underlying contract in addition to that of fraud. But May, L.J.
adopted the doctrine of strict autonomy of the financial instrument which is typical of the letter
of credit and would not admit such additional defences.
It is respectfully thought that the the stricter view of May, L.J. is correct.
Schmitthoff, supra note 61, at 108.
72 (C.A. July 17, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
73 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159. See supra note 11.
74 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
75 rd
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Agromark required the plaintiffs to establish performance bonds for
the contracts through Rafidain, the Iraqi state bank. The Iran-Iraq war
delayed performance of the contracts and disputes arose between the parties concerning moneys owed under the contracts and the repeated demands by Agromark for renewal of the performance bonds.76 When
Agromark began to call in the performance bonds, the English sellers
claimed the demands were fraudulent and sought injunctions restraining
their English bankers from paying out to Rafidain."

Ackner, L.J., considered the standard of proof of fraud required for
a court to enjoin payment of a performance bond.78 In a remarkably
candid tone, he compared United States law to English law and implicitly suggested that, in his view, the somewhat more flexible United States
rules as to proof of fraud for the injunction of performance bonds had
merit.7 9 More importantly, Ackner, L.J., rejected a stricter test of fraud
set forth by Justice Neill, in the lower court.8"
Neill, J., believed that the fraud test to be applied should be "the
standard of the hypothetical reasonable banker in possession of all the
relevant facts," and that unless the banker can say" 'this is plainly fraudulent; there cannot be any other explanation,' the courts cannot inter76 Id. The "extend or pay" type of demand requiring that the seller or supplier extend the date
of validity of the performance bond or pay the amount of the bond is fairly common and one or the
more unpleasant aspects of the demand performance bond. See Harbottle, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 150
("buyers demanded extensions of the guarantees... more or less as a matter of routine") and Esal,
supra note 44 (a number of requests for extension of validity of performance bond or payment made
by the Egyptian buyers). See also Edwards, supra note 2, at 285-86.
77 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
78 Ackner, L.J., stated that:
The evidence of fraud must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge.
The mere assertion or allegation of fraud would not be sufficient .... We would expect the
court to require strong corroborative evidence of the allegation, usually in the form of contemporary documents, particularly those emanating from the buyer. In general, for the evidence of
fraud to be clear, we would also expect the buyer to have been given an opportunity to answer
the allegation and to have failed to provide any, or any adequate answer in circumstances where
one could properly be expected. If the court considers that on the material before it the only
realistic inference to draw is that of fraud, then the seller would have made out a sufficient case
of fraud.
Id.
79 After describing the United States rules regarding the granting of injunctions in performance
bond situations, Ackner, L.J., said:
There is no suggestion that this more liberal approach has resulted in the commercial dislocation which has, by implication at least, been suggested would result from rejecting the respondent's submissions as to the standard of proof required from the plaintiffs. Moreover, we would
find it an unsatisfactory position if, having established an important exception to what had
previously been thought an absolute rule, the courts in practice were to adopt so restrictive an
approach to the evidence required as to prevent themselves from intervening. Were this to be
the case, impressive and high-sounding phrases such as "fraud unravels all" would become
meaningless.
Id.
80 1td.
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vene." 81 Ackner, L.J., preferred the apparently less stringent standard of
the "only realistic inference" test, stating that:
The corroborated evidence of a plaintiff and the unexplained failure of a
beneficiary to respond to the attack, although given a fair and proper opportunity, may well make the only realistic inference that of fraud,
although the possibility that he may ultimately come forward with an explanation cannot be ruled out. 82

However, even when Agromark remained silent and did not answer the
plaintiffs' claims that Agromark's demands on the bonds were fraudulent, Ackner, L.J., said this did not entitle the court to draw any strong
inference of guilt on the part of Agromark. As Ackner, L.J., recognized,
"Agromark [did] not "wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the English
courts and quite understandably take the view that it is Iraqui law that
has to be applied to the resolution of the disputes and... that litigation
should take place in Iraq" pursuant to the choice of law clauses in the
contracts.8 3 On this and several other grounds,8 4 Ackner, L.J., held that
the plaintiffs failed to meet the standard of proof of fraud required for the
court to grant an injunction against payment of the performance bonds.8 5
E. The Dodsal and Esal Cases
Despite language in Potton Homes and United Trading Corporation
which might indicate that the Court of Appeal was taking a more flexible
line toward the fraud exception in performance bond cases, two of the
more recent unreported cases, Dodsal PVT Ltd. v. Kingpull Ltd.86 and
Esal (Commodities) Ltd. v. Oriental Credit Ltd.8 7 indicate that, for the
81 See supra note 78. Ackner, L.J., applied his test to the facts of the case by asking: "Have the
plaintiffs established that it is seriously arguable that, on the materials available, the only realistic
inference is that Agromark could not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands on the
performance bonds?" Id. Note how Ackner, L.J., incorporated the "honest belief" standard of ED
& F Man (Sugar)Ltd. into his question. For more on the "honest belief" rule, see supra note 25.
For the view that there is little difference between the reasonable banker standard put forward by
Neill, J., and the "only realistic inference" test advanced by Ackner, L.J., see Schmitthoff, Export
Trade: PerformanceBonds; Standard of Proof Where Fraud is Alleged, 1984 J. Bus. L. 426, 428.
82 United Trading Corp., supra note 1. See supra note 81.
83 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
84 Id The most significant "other ground" for the denial of the plaintiffs' injunction by Ackner,
L.J., was that the plaintiffs impliedly had "unclean hands" since over the course of time in which
Agromark had made repeated "extend or pay" demands with respect to performance bonds for
contracts which had already been performed, the plaintiffs had granted the extensions without disclosing to the bank that any calls on the bonds during such extended periods would be fraudulent.
Id. Professor C.M. Schmitthoff says that "[flortunately this statement in an otherwise elucidating
judgment is merely a dictum." Schmitthoff, supra note 81, at 429.
85 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
86 (C.A. July 1, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
87 Esal, supra note 44.
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moment, the Court of Appeal remains wedded to the stricter principles
of Edward Owen.
Dodsal involved a lease agreement between Kingpull, English lessors
of pipelaying equipment, and Dodsal PVT, an Indian pipeline company.
The lease agreement called for a "bid bond" to be established at a
London bank as security for the lessee's performance of its obligations
under the lease.8" When Dodsal went into arrears on its payments under
the lease agreement, Kingpull demanded payment of the bond from Standard Chartered, the London bank holding the bond. Upon hearing of
the demand, Dodsal attempted to negotiate with Kingpull to persuade
them to withdraw their instructions to Standard Chartered invoking the
bond. When these attempts failed, Dodsal brought an action against
Kingpull to stop payment on the bond. 9
The court granted Dodsal an injunction until there could be an inter
partes hearing. The effect of the injunction was that the funds from the
bond were paid into court while awaiting the hearing. At the hearing,
Justice Lawson called the bond "a penalty" and stayed the injunction,
granting Kingpull leave to appeal.9"
In response to Dodsal's claim that Kingpull's attempt to enforce the
bond was unconscionable conduct sufficient to constitute fraud, Neill,
L.J., in the Court of Appeal, cited Hamzeh Malas,9 1 Edward Owen,9 2
Howe Richardson,93 and United Trading Corporation94 for the proposition that "the contract between the bank and the beneficiary is a contract
quite distinct from that between the principal parties."9 5 Neill, L.J.,
stated that:
In each of these cases.., the grounds upon which the court has contem88 Dodsal,supra note 25.
89 Id.
90 Lawson, J., treated Kingpull's call on the bond as a penalty because the amount by which
Dodsal was in arrears was so small-between $2,500 and $9,000--in comparison to the amount of
the bond ($350,000). Id. This would appear to be an unprecedented approach to a performance
bond of this type and one contrary to prior law. The treatment of demand performance bonds as
penalties was implicitly rejected by Lord Denning, M.R., in Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 170
(statement that:
that course of action [demand on the bond and payment by the confirming bank] ... can be
followed, not only when there are substantial breaches of contract, but also when the breaches
are insubstantial or trivial, in which case they bear the colour of a penalty rather than liquidated
damages: or even when the breaches are merely allegations by the customer without any proof
at all: or even when the breaches are non-existent. The performance guarantee then bears the
colour of a discount on the price of 10 per cent. or 5 per cent....
91 [1985] 2 Q.B. 127.
92 [1978] 1 Q.B. 159.
93 [1978] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 161.
94 (C.A. July 17, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
95 Dodsal,supra note 25.
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plated that an injunction could be granted appear to have been limited to
knowledge of fraud or lack of honest belief. There may, of course, be cases
where no injunction could be granted against a bank because they had no
reason to know of, or even suspect, any fraudulent conduct but where relief
could be obtained against the beneficiary whose lack of honest belief in his
right to make a claim could be clearly demonstrated. But the cases show
that in the absence of bad faith the bond or guarantee will be enforced.9 6

Finding no fraud or lack of honest belief on the part of Kingpull, Neill,
L.J., held that the injunction should be lifted and Kingpull allowed to
demand and receive payment under the bond. 97
The most recent performance bond case at the time of this writing
was Esal (Commodities) Ltd. v. Oriental Credit Ltd.98 This case dealt
with the question of what notice the issuing bank had to give the seller or
seller's bank in the event of a request for payment of the bond with an
option to extend the bond's expiration date. Ackner, L.J., held that in
the absence of a contractual provision or course of dealing between the
parties that might give rise to some implied agreement, the issuing bank
had no duty to give notice to the seller or seller's bank of such a
demand. 99
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Esal, supra note 76. The Esal case involved an English commodity trader, Reltor, who entered into a contract for the sale of sugar with Estram, an Egyptian corporation. Oriental Credit
Ltd. were Reltor's London bankers. Oriental Credit instructed the London branch of Wells Fargo to
arrange a confirmed performance bond through Wells Fargo's Egyptian correspondent, Banque du
Caire, in favor of Estram.
Estram later made an extend-or-pay demand to Banque du Caire who informed Wells Fargo in
London and asked for a reply. Wells Fargo neither passed on this demand to Oriental Credit nor
replied to Banque du Caire. Shortly thereafter, Estram made a similar demand which Banque du
Caire passed on to Wells Fargo which then notified Oriental Credit but did not say that a prior
request had been made. Oriental Credit then spoke to Reltor which refused to authorize the extension and claimed that that performance bond had expired between the date of the first and second
demands. Estram made two more demands on the bond, both of which were refused by Reltor on
the same grounds. Banque du Caire was given no authority to comply with the demand. Estram
then brought arbitration proceedings against Banque du Caire for the amount of the bond.
Sometime after the Egyptian arbitration tribunal had found in favor of Estram and against
Banque du Caire in the amount of the bond, plus interest and costs, Reltor went into liquidation.
The Court of Appeal treated the case as a claim for summary judgment in the amount of the bond by
Banque du Caire against Wells Fargo and, if successful, a claim by Wells Fargo against Oriental
Credit Ltd. Lord Justices Ackner, Neill and Glidewell found in favor of Banque du Caire against
Wells Fargo and in favor of Wells Fargo against Oriental Credit. Id.
99 Ackner, L.J., stated that there is no "implied condition which obliges a bank to inform the
customer before it pays pursuant to the demand." However, Ackner, L.J., made the point that "we
can be confident that the bank will promptly inform [the customer] of any claim that it meets, in
order to obtain its indemnity." Id. With regard to the question of whether the bank had to give the
customer notice of an extend-or-pay request, Ackner, L.J., said "[tihe fact that as a matter of good
business practice and courtesy, a bank would refer such a request to the customer, does not in itself
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THE MAREVA INJUNCTION

A. Introduction
In many of the previously discussed cases involving the attempted
injunction of performance bonds and bank guarantees, the plaintiffs
sought, and in some instances the Court of Appeal considered, the grant

of a Mareva injunction against either the party demanding the bond, the
bank being called upon to either indemnify or pay on the bond, or the

party holding the proceeds of the bond."

°

In some cases, the lower

courts granted Mareva injunctions temporarily, usually pending an inter
partes hearing.01 ' In no case has the Court of Appeal granted a Mareva

injunction to a plaintiff seeking to enjoin the payment of a performance
bond or bank guarantee, though it has indicated its willingness to do so if

a plaintiff supplied the necessary proof of fraud."°2 The remainder of this
Comment will examine the character and development of the Mareva
injunction and past attempts to use the Mareva injunction against alleged
fraudulent demands on performance bonds and bankers' guarantees.
The Mareva injunction is an ex parte, interlocutory measure in-

tended to freeze a defendant's assets prior to judgment in order to pre03 It
vent the removal of those assets from the jurisdiction of the court. 1
is roughly equivalent to United States attachment procedures and the

French saisie conservatoire.104
The Mareva injunction came into being in 1975 in the case of Nippon
create any duty, unless in addition there was such a course of dealing between the parties as to give
rise to some implied agreement .... Id.
100 See EdwardOwen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 171 (statement of Lord Denning, M.R., that "[t]his case is
altogether different from Mareva.. ."); The Bhoja Trader, [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. at 257-58 (Mareva
injunction granted in lower court by Justice Staughton restraining sellers from removing proceeds of
bank guarantee from the jurisdiction and recognition by Donaldson, L.J., in the Court of Appeal
that the Court might in an appropriate case impose a Mareva injunction upon the fruits of a letter of
credit or guarantee); Potton Homes, supra note 16 (conclusion of May, L.J., that Justice Hawser in
the lower court did not err in law in refusing to grant the plaintiffs' Mareva injunction); United
Trading Corp., supra note 1 (Mareva injunction granted temporarily against Rafidain by Neill, J.,
and holding of Ackner, L.J., in the Court of Appeal that "plaintiffs must.., fail in their application
for a Mareva injunction"); and Dodsal, supra note 25 (refusal of Neill, L.J., to impose a Mareva
injunction on the proceeds of the bid bond when received by Kingpull and statement by Lord Justice
Bacombe that "the question of a Mareva injunction does not arise...").
101 See The Bhoja Trader, [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 256 and United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
102 See United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
103 See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A., v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's L.R.
509. See also Powles, The Mareva Injunction, 1978 J.Bus. L. 11; Powles, Mareva Round-up-I,
1982 J. Bus. L. 383; Asher, Where to Now Mareva?, 1983 N.Z.L.J. 360; and Martin, Mareva Injunctions, 59 Austl. L.J. 22 (1985).
104 See Tetley, Attachment, the Mareva Injunction and Saisie Conservatoire, LLOYD'S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 58 (1985).
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Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis,1°5 although it takes its name from the second case in which it was applied, Mareva CompaniaNavieraS.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A.." 6 The statutory basis claimed by Lord
Denning, M.R., for the Mareva injunction in Nippon Yusen Kaisha was
section 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act
1925.107 More recently, the court's power to grant Mareva injunctions
has been confirmed by section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.10
In Mareva Compania Naviera S.A., 1°9 the plaintiffs owned the ship
Mareva and had leased it to International Bulkcarriers. International
Bulkcarriers then sublet the ship to the Indian government."1 ° However,
International Bulkcarriers failed to pay the plaintiffs a portion of the contract price, even though International Bulkcarriers had themselves been
paid by the Indian government. The plaintiff shipowners then brought a
105 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093. Nippon Yusen Kaishav. Karageorgisinvolved the charter of three ships
by the plaintiff Japanese shipowners to the defendant Greek charterers. The Greek charterers failed
to pay the charterparty hire. However, the plaintiffs discovered that the defendants had funds on
deposit at London banks and sought an injunction to restrain their removal. Id. at 1094. Lord
Denning, M.R., stated that:
There is no reason why the High Court or this court should not make an order such as is asked
for here. It is warranted by section 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act
1925 which says that the High Court may grant a mandamus or injunction or appoint a receiver
by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so
to do. It seems to me that this is just such a case. There is a strong prima facie case that the
hire is owing and unpaid. If an injunction is not granted, these moneys may be removed out of
the jurisdiction and the shipowners will have the greatest difficulty in recovering anything.
Id. at 1095. Lord Justices Browne and Lane agreed with Lord Denning, M.R., that the plaintiffs
should be granted the injunction they sought. Lane, L.J., stated that "there is no reason why the
court should not assist a litigant who is in danger of losing money to which he is admittedly entitled." Id.
106 [1975] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 509.
107 See supra note 105.
108 In Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 571 (1981), Lord Denning, M.R., stated that
"[t]heMareva injunction is now an established feature of English law. The principles applicable to it
... have been stated in numerous cases from 1975 to 1981. They have been given statutory force by
section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 .... " Chapter 54, section 37(1)-(3) states that:
(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.
(2) Any order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the
court thinks just.
(3) The power of the High Court under subsection (1) to grant an interlocutory injunction
restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from the jurisdiction of the High Court,
or otherwise dealing with, assets located within that jurisdiction shall be exercisable in cases
where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, resident or present within that
jurisdiction.
1981 U.K., ch. 54. It has been claimed by at least two commentators that the jurisdictional basis of
the Mareva injunction has shifted from § 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act 1925 and § 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to the inherent obligation of the courts to
administer justice. See Martin, supra note 103, at 23 and Hetherington, Inherent Powers and the
Mareva Jurisdiction, 10 SYDNEY L. REv. 76 (1983).
109 [1975] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 509.
110 Id.
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claim in the High Court for damages in the unpaid amount."' Upon
discovering that there were funds sufficient to satisfy the judgment in the
defendants' London bank account, the plaintiffs sought "an injunction to

restrain the disposal of those moneys... in the bank.""

2

Lord Denning,

M.R., stated that:
If it appears that the debt is due and owing-and there is a danger that the
debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment-the
Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant 13an interlocutory judgment
so as to prevent him disposing of those assets.

Finding that there was a danger that the shipowners might not get the
amounts due to them under the time charter if the funds were withdrawn
from the London bank, Lord Denning, M.R., held that the court should
grant the shipowners the injunction they sought." 4 Roskill, L.J., noted
in his judgment that "[i]f therefore this Court does not interfere by injunction... the plaintiffs will suffer a grave injustice which this Court
has power to help avoid.. .. ""'
B.

The Development of the Mareva Injunction

Since the Mareva case, the Mareva injunction has become a muchused tool of English civil procedure." 6 The Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords have gradually established rules governing the application of the Mareva injunction to particular situations and tests which
must be met before a Mareva injunction will be granted.'
Perhaps the
most significant Mareva case to date is Siskina (Cargo Owners) v. Distos
Compania Naviera S.A., " s in which the House of Lords held that plainIII

Id. at 510.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 511.
115 Id.
116 See Comment, Prejudgement Attachment inEngland: The Mareva Injunction, 5 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 143, 144 (1982).
117 See Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (The
"Pertamina"), [1978] 1 Q.B. 644 (1977) (Mareva injunction applies to both money and goods); Siskina (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A., [1979] A.C. 210
(1977) (parties seeking a Mareva injunction must have a pre-existing cause of action under English
law); Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645 (guidelines for
parties seeking Mareva injunctions set out by Lord Denning, M.R.; Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980]
1W.L.R. 1259 (Mareva injunction may be applied to English as well as foreign defendants); Clipper
Maritime Co. Ltd. of Monrovia v. Mineralimportexport, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1262 (terms of Mareva
injunction may be varied if they have an adverse effect on third parties); and Z Ltd. v. A, supra note
108 (rules established by Lord Denning, M.R., for the application of the Mareva injunction to banks
and other third parties).
118 [1979] A.C. 210. The Siskina case involved an attempt by the owners of cargo which had
been on board the Siskina to attach the London insurance proceeds stemming from the sinking of
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tiffs applying for a Mareva injunction must have a preexisting cause of
action under English law against the defendant that is separate and dis-

tinct from the plaintiff's application for a Mareva injunction.119 That is,
under Siskina, an application for a Mareva injunction cannot be used by
a plaintiff to bring into English court an action English courts would not
otherwise have the jurisdiction to hear.12 This limitation on the Mareva
injunction clearly stands as a hurdle to those parties who, like the parties
the Siskina shortly after its owners had unloaded its cargo at Cyprus and put a lien on the cargo for
the payment of the charterparty by the third party charterers. The bills of lading upon which the
owners of the cargo based their claim against the shipowners contained a clause giving exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts of Genoa, Italy. But the only assets of the defendant shipowners were the
insurance proceeds to be paid in London for the loss of the ship. In the Court of Appeal, Lord
Denning, M.R., and Lawton, L.J., granted the plaintiffs' Mareva injunction. Recognizing that he
was extending the scope of the Mareva injunction significantly, Lord Denning, M.R., quoted Cowper, stating:
To the timorous souls I would say...
"Ye fearful saints, fresh courage take,
The Clouds ye so much dread
Are big with mercy, and shall break
In blessings on your head."
Instead of "saints," read "judges."
Instead of "mercy," read "justice."
And you will find a good way to law reform.
Id. at 236. While the approach advocated by Lord Denning, M.R., may be appealing to the more
equity-minded and those in favor of judicial activism, it received short shrift, first, from Lord Justice
Bridge who dissented in the Court of Appeal, and later from Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone in
the House of Lords. Bridge, L.J., stated that he was "clearly of the opinion that we should not allow
the urgent merits of particular plaintiffs, whom we see in peril of being deprived of any effective
remedy, to tempt us to assume the mantle of legislators. The clouds in Lord Denning, M.R.'s adaptation of William Cowper may be big with justice but we are neither midwives or rainmakers." Id
at 243. Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone in the House of Lords stated that:
The second point upon which I wish to comment is the argument of Lord Denning, M.R.,
fortified by the authority of a quotation from Hymns Ancient and Modern, that the judges need
not wait for the authority of the Rules Committee in order to sanction a change in practice,
indeed an extension of jurisdiction, in matters of this kind. The jurisdiction of the Rules Committee is statutory, and for judges of first instance or on appeal to pre-empt its functions is, at
least in my opinion, for the courts to usurp the function of the legislature.
Id at 262.
119 Lord Diplock stated that:
A right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It cannot stand on its
own. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant
arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal or equitable right of the
plaintiff for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.
The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the preexisting cause of action. It is granted to preserve the status quo pending the ascertainment by
the court of the rights of the parties and the grant to the plaintiff of the relief to which his cause
of action entitles him, which may or may not include a final injunction.
Id at 256.
120 Lord Diplock went on to state that:
To argue that the claim to monetary compensation is justiciable in the High Court because if it
were justiciableit would give rise to an ancillary right to a Mareva injunction... appears to me
to involve the fallacy of petitio principiior, in the vernacular, an attempt to pull oneself up by
one's own bootstraps.
Id at 257 (emphasis in original).
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in Edward Owen and United Trading Corporation, have agreed that a
contract will be governed by foreign law and that all disputes will be
settled in a foreign court.' 2 1
The first comprehensive set of guidelines for the grant of a Mareva
injunction were established by Lord Denning, M.R., in Third Chandris
Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine S.A.,"2' which followed the Siskina
decision by the House of Lords. Lord Denning, M.R., said an applicant
for a Mareva injunction should: (1) make "full and frank" disclosure of
all matters in its knowledge which are material for the judge to know;
(2) give particulars of the claim against the defendant, including the
grounds of the claim and the amount in issue, and the points made
against the claim by the defendant; (3) provide some grounds for believing the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; (4) give some
grounds for believing that there is a risk of assets being removed from the
jurisdiction prior to judgment or satisfaction of the award; and (5) undertake to pay damages in the event the claim fails or the injunction proves
to be unjustified. 123
In the enigmatic case of ZLtd. v. A-Z andAA-LL, 12 4 Lord Denning,
M.R., established ten requirements to be met by plaintiffs seeking to impose Mareva injunctions on defendants' funds or other assets in the possession of a bank or other third party within the jurisdiction of the
court. 125 First, to the extent that a bank is asked or required to take
action, incurs expenses, or is exposed to liability on account of the injunction, the plaintiff is required to recoup all expenses and indemnify
the bank against any liability.'2 6 Second, the plaintiff must inform the
bank or other third party with as much precision as possible what to do
or not to do with regard to the assets in question, identifying, if possible,
by branch and heading the bank account and any other asset subject to
the injunction.'22 Third, in the event the plaintiff is unable to identify the
bank account or other asset with any degree of precision, the plaintiff
may request the bank or other third party to conduct a search for any
assets of the defendant currently being held, if the plaintiff promises to
pay the cost of the search. 22 Fourth, the plaintiff should tell the judge in
121 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
122 [1979] 1 Q.B. 645.
123 Id.

at 668-69.

124 [1982] 1 Q.B. 558.
125 Id. at 575-77.
126 Id. at 575.
127 Id.

128 Id. However, according to Lord Denning, M.R., "[tihe bank may not tell the plaintiff the
result of the search, lest it breaks the confidence of the customer. But if it finds that the defendant
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his application for a Mareva injunction the names of the banks and 1other
29
third parties the plaintiff proposes to give notice of the injunction.
The fifth requirement set forth by Lord Denning, M.R., states that,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff
should insert a maximum amount of funds to be restrained in order to
avoid unfairly preventing the defendant from dealing with any excess
funds. 130 Sixth, also depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case, the defendant should be allowed to use a specified amount for "normal living expenses." 131 Seventh, if the defendant's funds are believed to
be in a joint account, the injunction may be issued in terms wide enough
to include the joint account. 132 Eighth, in the event that a Mareva injunction is granted exparte, the court retains the right to grant it only for
a few days or until the defendant and the bank or other third party can
be heard.133 Ninth, the plaintiff seeking a Mareva injunction should undertake to pay the defendant for any damages incurred as a result of the
injunction and, as previously mentioned, pay the bank or other third
party for any expenses reasonably incurred by them as a result of the
injunction. 134 Tenth, the defendant may be required by the court on the
return date to specifically disclose the existence of assets sufficient to
meet the claim.

C.

135

The Application of the Mareva Injunction to Performance Bonds

Long before the Mareva injunction came into being, Lord Denning,
M.R., granted an injunction against a banker's guarantee in the case of
Elian and Rabbath v. Matsas and Matsas.136 While recognizing that "a
has an account, it will freeze it for its own protection: so that it will not be in contempt of court."

Id.

129 Id. at 576. This, however, does not preclude the plaintiff from giving notice to other banks
and third parties in the event more information is obtained. Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 id. at 577.
133 Id.

134 Id.
135 Id. Lord Denning, M.R., stated that if the defendant comes on the return date and says he has
assets sufficient to meet the claim, then he ought to specify them. If the defendant refuses to disclose
his assets, his refusal will go to show he is attempting to evade payment. Id.
136 [1966] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 495. Elian involved a bank guarantee given by a Beirut shipping firm to
Greek shipowners' London agents as consideration for the release of a lien the shipowners had exercised against the goods. The shipowners released the first lien but later imposed another lien. The
shipowners then sought to enforce the guarantee which was at a London bank. Lord Denning,
M.R., thought it unfair that the shipowners should be able to demand the guarantee when a second
lien had been imposed despite the apparent understanding between the parties that once the guaran-

tee was given the original lien would be lifted and no more liens imposed by the shipowners. Id. at
496-97.
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bank guarantee [was] very much like a letter of credit [which] ...Courts
will do their utmost to enforce... according to its terms," Lord Denning, M.R., nonetheless stated that "[c]ircumstances may arise such as to
warrant interference by injunction."' 137 Lord Denning, M.R., went on to
say that he believed this was "a special case in which an injunction
should be granted."13' 8 Lord Justice Danckwerts agreed, stating that
"[w]hatever may be the final result of the case, it seems to me this is an
instance where the Court should interfere and prevent what might be an
irretrievable injustice being done to the plaintiffs in the circumstances."' 139 But in the Edward Owen case twelve years later-in which
the facts infer more strongly than in Elian that the plaintiffs were being
treated unjustly-Lord Denning, M.R., merely stated that the Edward
Owen case was "different from the other cases which are cited to us, such
as Elian and Rabbath v. Matsas and Matsas.... This [Edward Owen] is
a new case on a performance bond or guarantee which must be decided
140
on the principle applicable to it.'
In Howe Richardson Scale Co. Ltd. v. Polimex-Cekop,14 1 a performance bond case cited by Lord Denning, M.R., in Edward Owen, Roskill,
L.J., distinguished Elian, noting that Elian should "be regarded as a very
special case; it certainly goes further than the subsequent cases." 14 2
Therefore, despite Elian's appealing fairness-oriented rationale, it is suggested that the Elian case is of little precedential value for the injunction
of bankers' guarantees and performance bonds.
In Edward Owen, Lord Denning, M.R., said that the Edward Owen
case was "altogether different from Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v.
143 Lord
InternationalBulkcarriersLtd.... and the Siskina.... ,,
Denning, M.R., attempted to distinguish the Mareva and Siskina cases from
Edward Owen by pointing out that in Mareva and Siskina the court had
stopped money in England from being paid out to debtors who were
likely to remove assets from England in order to avoid paying their
debts. 1" While he did not make clear the distinction, Lord Denning,
137 Id. at 497.
138 Id.

139 Id. at 498. Note the similarity of this statement to the statement of Roskill, L.J., in Mareva.
See note 115 and accompanying text.
140 Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 172.
141 [1978] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 161.
142 Id. at 165.
143 Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 172.
144 Id.It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs' counsel in Edward Owen did not argue for the
application of a Mareva injunction. Rather, they sought an interim injunction against the performance bond on the basis of the "balance of convenience" standard of American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396. Counsel for the defense stated rather flatly that "the principle [of
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M.R., apparently regarded the status of the Libyan party in Edward
Owen as somewhat different from the foreign parties in the Mareva and
Siskina cases. 145
The question of whether a Mareva injunction could be applied to a
bank guarantee came up squarely in Intraco Ltd. v. Notis Shipping Corporation (The "'BhojaTrader").146 The Bhoja Trader involved a bank guarantee given by the buyers of the ship Bhoja Trader to the sellers as part of
the purchase price. After the ship had been arrested in Calcutta in apparent contravention of the sellers' promise that the ship would be free of
all liens and encumbrances at the time of delivery, Justice Goff granted
the buyers an ex parte injunction restraining the sellers from demanding
payment of the guarantee from the London bank. The buyers brought
arbitration proceedings in London against the sellers for breach of the
sale contract. The sellers, however, had no assets in England save their
rights under the bank guarantee.14 7
After hearing both parties' arguments, Staughton, J. lifted the first
injunction but imposed a Mareva injunction restraining the sellers "from
removing from the jurisdiction or otherwise disposing of any of their assets and in particular moneys payable under [the] guarantee... ,,la.
When the case came before the Court of Appeal, Donaldson, L.J., stated
that the fraud exception "did not prevent the court, in an appropriate
case, from imposing a Mareva injunction upon the fruits of the letter of
credit or guarantee."149 However, Donaldson, L.J., went on to point out
that the banker's guarantee in question was payable not in London but in
Piraeus, Greece, and that if the guarantee were to be treated as cash in
hand between the parties, it must be treated as cash in hand in Greece. 150
On that ground, Donaldson, L.J., held that the Mareva injunction restraining the sellers must be discharged.1 5 ' Lord Denning, M.R., later
Mareva] cannot apply here because the asset is not that of the wrongdoer. The present case is a long
way from the Mareva principle which applies to securing the asset of a wrongdoer in this country."
Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 163. For the distinction between the American Cyanamid interim
injunction and the Mareva injunction, see Asher, supra note 103, at 361.
145 But cf Z Ltd. v. 4, supra note 108, at 574 (statement of Lord Denning, M.R., that the Mareva
injunction "does not prevent payment under a letter of credit or under a bank guarantee... but it
may apply to the proceeds as and when received by or for the defendant.").
146 [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 256.
147 Id. at 257.
148 Id. The Mareva injunction granted by Staughton, J., had the effect of freezing the proceeds of
the bond. Id.
149 Id. at 258. Donaldson, L.J., went on to state that "[e]njoining the beneficiary from removing
the cash asset from the jurisdiction is not the same as taking action, whether by injunction or an
order staying execution, which will prevent him obtaining the cash ... ." Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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affirmed the assertion by Donaldson, L.J., that a Mareva injunction could
be applied to the proceeds of a bank guarantee or performance bond in Z
Ltd. v. A, l" 2 where he stated that, while the Mareva injunction does not
prevent payment under a letter of credit or bank guarantee, "it may ap' 153
ply to the proceeds as and when received by or for the defendant."
Although a Mareva injunction was not granted to the plaintiffs in
Potton Homes,'54 Hawser, J., in the lower court, recognized that under
the Bhoja Trader case he had jurisdiction in an appropriate case to grant
a Mareva injunction against the proceeds of a performance bond in the
hands of the recipient. However, in light of the defendants' financial status, Hawser, J., decided that this was not an appropriate case for the
grant of a Mareva injunction.15 5 In the Court of Appeal, Eveleigh, L.J.,
addressed the reluctance of Hawser, J., to grant a Mareva injunction restraining the buyers from making a call on the bond. Eveleigh, L.J.,
stated that he:
would wish at least to leave it open for consideration how far the bond is to
be treated as cash in hand as between the buyer and seller. It is sufficient to
say that I do not think that the court is restrained by authority to say that it
has no jurisdiction to consider this matter under section 37 of the Supreme
Court Act 1981 .... The court's power under section 37 is very wide....

The learned judge [Hawser, J.] did not consider the exercise of his5 jurisdic6
tion under section 37. Consequently, this court is free to do so.
Eveleigh, L.J., did, however, defer to the decision of Hawser, J., that a
Mareva injunction was not appropriate in this case, pointing out that the
facts of the case did not warrant the court's interference with the parties'
agreement with regard to the bond.' 5 7
In United Trading CorporationS.A. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd., 5 ' the
Court of Appeal contemplated granting the plaintiff sellers a Mareva injunction against the London banks indemnified to pay the performance
bonds which had been called on in alleged bad faith by the buyers,
Agromark. Initially, Neill, J., granted the plaintiffs a Mareva injunction
against Rafidain, restraining it from removing from the jurisdiction or
otherwise dealing with funds received by its London branch from Barclays, the sellers' bank, under one of the performance bonds.' 5 9 Nonetheless, after hearing both parties' arguments sometime later, Neill, J.,
152 [1982] 1 Q.B. 558.

153 See supra note 145.
154 Potton Homes, supra note 16.
155 Id.

156 Id. For the text of section 37, see supra note 108. See also Hetherington, supra note 108.
157 Potton Homes, supra note 16.
158 United Trading Corp., supra note 1.
159 Id.
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discharged the Mareva injunction against Rafidain.1 6 °
In the Court of Appeal, the plaintiffs sought injunctions that would
prevent the London banks which were to indemnify Rafidain in the
amount of the performance bonds from paying any money to Rafidain.
The plaintiffs also sought to restrain Rafidain from paying the proceeds
of the guarantees to the Iraqi government. 16 1 While acknowledging that
the plaintiffs had a very strong case, Ackner, L.J., held that "they ha[d]
not established a good arguable case that the only realistic inference
[was] that the demands were fraudulent.. . ."162 On that ground and
others, the Court of Appeal held that "the plaintiffs must... fail in their
application for a Mareva injunction." 163 This outcome and the language
used by Ackner, L.J., implies that, had the plaintiffs met their burden of
proof as to the fraudulent demands for the bonds and the banks' knowledge thereof, the Court of Appeal would have been prepared to impose
Mareva injunctions on both the English issuing banks and the London
branch of Rafidain. 64
D.

The Present State of the Law

Despite the candid discussion by Ackner, L.J., of a potentially lower
standard of proof of fraud in United Trading Corporation,the outcome of
that case, as well as the more recent Dodsal and Esal cases, indicates that
the Court of Appeal will, for the present, continue to adhere to the strict
fraud rule. The court will not grant an injunction of payment of a performance bond or bankers' guarantee unless the plaintiff can provide
clear proof of fraud or lack of honest belief on the part of the defendant
and knowledge thereof on the part of the paying bank at the time of the
demand.16 5 One might well ask whether this moots the question of the
Mareva injunction's applicability to performance bonds and bank guarantees altogether. However, it is clear that where a plaintiff satisfies the
160 Id. The injunctions were, however, allowed to remain in place pending the plaintiffs' appeal.
161 Id
162

Id.

163 Id.

164 Id. Apparently Barclays were to pay the amount of the bond to Rafidain's London branch
which would then either credit the appropriate account or transfer the funds to Iraq. So it would
have been possible for the plaintiffs to obtain a Mareva injunction against the proceeds of the bond
after Barclays had paid it to Rafidain's London branch. The funds would still have been within the
jurisdiction of the court. Parties required to give performance bonds or bank guarantees would do
well to inquire as to the location of the paying bank and whether it has a London branch. One might
even attempt to make the bond or guarantee payable in London, though this might require more
bargaining power than the average seller possesses.
165 See supra note 11.
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jurisdictional requirements of Siskina 166 and complies with the guidelines established by Lord Denning, M.R., in Third Chandris16 7 and Z

Ltd. v. A, 68 the court may, in an appropriate case, impose a Mareva
injunction on the proceeds of a performance bond or bank guarantee. 169
There is some question as to the suitability of the Mareva injunction

in demand bond cases where the parties have agreed that the contract is
to be governed by foreign law and all disputes taken up in a foreign

court. 170 By definition, the Mareva injunction contemplates future arbitration or litigation within the jurisdiction of the court granting the
Mareva injunction. 171 Wholly apart from the jurisdictional requirements
166 [1979] A.C. 210. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
167 [1979] 1 Q.B. 645. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
168 [1982] 1 Q.B. 558. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
169 See The Bhoja Trader, supra note 15. See also supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
170 See United Trading Corp., supra note 1. Wholly apart from the jurisdictional question, it can
be argued that the Mareva injunction is peculiarly well-suited for application to certain performance
bond situations, especially those instances where there is a danger of funds leaving the jurisdiction
quickly. See Barclay-Johnson, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 1264, 1266 (statements by Sir Robert Megarry,
Vice-Chancellor, that "the heart and core of the Mareva injunction is the risk of the defendant
removing his assets from the jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment given by the courts in the
action" and that "the £3,300 in the bank account, like the £70,000 in the CharteredBank case [1980]
1 W.L.R. 107, can as Lord Denning, M.R. put it at p. 113, 'be removed at the stroke of a pen from
England outside the reach of creditors'. ").
In United Trading Corp., at least one of the performance bonds was payable by Barclays to the
London branch of Rafidain, the buyer's Iraqi bank. See supra note 164. Presumably, the funds
would then be transferred from the London branch of Rafidain to the Iraqi branch that had paid the
Iraqi buyers on demand. The speed with which funds of this sort can be moved prompted Lawton,
L.J., to state in Third Chandris, [1979] 1 Q.B. at 670 that:
By a few words spoken into a radio telephone or tapped out on a telex machine bank balances
can be transferred from one country to another and within seconds can come to rest in a bank
which is untraceable or, even if known, such balances cannot be reached by any effective legal
process.
However, quite often there will be a gap between the time payment of the bond or bank guarantee is
demanded and the time the bank actually makes payment. See Dodsal,supra note 25 (amount of
performance bond payable to Kingpull by bank on the twenty-eighth day following the bank's receipt of written demand). It is suggested that sellers whose performance bonds or bank guarantees
have been called on in suspect circumstances use this time gap for discovery and, if appropriate,
application for a Mareva injunction against payment of the bond. See Rosenblith, What Happens
When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining the Letter of Credit and Other Legal Stratagems, 17
U.C.C.L.J. 307, 323 (1985). Depending on the circumstances, the seller may seek a Mareva injunction against (I) the amount of the bond being held by the paying bank prior to payment as in Dodsal
and/or (2) the proceeds of the bond if they are to be or already have been paid out by the paying
bank to the beneficiary where the beneficiary or his bank account is within the jurisdiction and the
bond is payable within the jurisdiction, The Bhoja Trader, [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 256; or (3) the
proceeds of the bond if they are to be or already have been paid out to a paying bank or its London
branch by another bank also within the jurisdiction, see supra note 164; or (4) the amount to be paid
out by the issuing bank within the jurisdiction as indemnification to the foreign paying bank where
the foreign bank has already paid out on the bond. See Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. 159; Bolivinter
Oil, [1984] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 251; Esal, supra note 76.
171 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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of Siskina, there is the question of whether a court may impose a Mareva
injunction on an issuing or paying bank, thereby compelling the foreign
party to either forget about the bond or submit to the jurisdiction of the
court and pursue a legal remedy even if the terms of the contract or
performance bond agreement clearly manifest the intent of the parties to
avoid such a result. 172 These considerations, however, may be disregarded if the plaintiff can show that the demand on the performance
bond or bank guarantee was fraudulent and that the bank had knowledge
of that fraud.' 73 Lord Diplock stated in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada that:
The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non
orituractio of, if plain English is to be preferred, "fraud unravels all." The
courts will not
allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry
17 4
out a fraud.
Thus, in the event the plaintiff satisfies the proof requirements of the
fraud exception, it appears that the court will impose a Mareva injunction on both the issuing banks and, if it is within the jurisdiction of the
court, the paying bank or its branch.' 7 5 The beneficiary of the bond
would then have the option of either acquiescing to the injunction or
bringing an action in the jurisdiction to show that the demand was not in
fact fraudulent.
Apart from recourse to the courts to enjoin a performance bond
called on in bad faith, there are other alternatives for the seller or supplier who must give a performance bond or bank guarantee but would
like to minimize the risk of a bad faith call. In Esal (Commodities) Ltd.
v. Oriental Credit Ltd., Ackner, L.J., stated by way of dicta that:
The requirement that [the buyer] must when making his demand for payment in order to support his request for an extension, also commit himself
to claiming that the contract has not been complied with, may prevent
some of the many
abuses of the performance bond procedure which un176
doubtedly occur.

Ackner, L.J., seemed to suggest that it might be useful for sellers to require buyers demanding payment of a performance bond to affirmatively
state to a paying bank that the seller failed to perform under the contract.1 77 While the bank has no means of checking the veracity of such
an assertion, the mere requirement of the statement might have a mini172 See supra note 10.
173 United City, [1982] 2 All E.R. at 725.
174 Id.

175 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
176 Esal, supra note 76.
177 Id
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mal deterrent effect against would-be fraudulent demands.1 78 From an
ex post perspective, the statement might have useful evidentiary value to
a seller attempting to show that the demand was in fact fraudulent and
that the bank knew or should have known it to be so. Such a condition,
however, would have to be established between the parties in the performance bond agreement; its presence or absence would depend on the
79
parties' respective bargaining power. 1
If conditionality is not a realistic option, sellers or contractors required to give performance bonds might consider other alternatives such
as a higher contract price and insurance. In a competitive bidding situation, however, a higher contract price is not always an option if the party
hopes to be awarded the contract.18 0 And in a falling commodity market, traders' profit margins may be so thin that any amount otherwise
reserved to protect against a bad faith demand may be squeezed out. 8 '
Furthermore, if the establishment of a performance bond or bank guarantee is a precondition to the making of a contract and the bond is called
on in bad faith, the seller will not get any of the contract price. 1 82 A
seller or contractor may be able to obtain insurance in the amount of the
bond against a bad faith call. Such insurance is available in the United
Kingdom from the government's Export Credits Guarantee Department
and Lloyd's.183 However, in the event that the seller cannot include the
amount of the bond in the contract price and insurance is unavailable or
too costly, the seller's final recourse will be to the courts for an injunction
if there is a bad faith call on the bond.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is not suggested that the standard of proof of fraud required to
enjoin a performance bond or bankers' guarantee be lowered or that
178 See Edwards, supra note 2, at 286. Edwards states that:
a rule to the effect that the beneficiary must sign a statement detailing how the principal has
been at fault might discourage abusive calling for example: "We undertake to pay upon your
first demand stating inter alia in what respect our principals have not complied with the contract." If such a statement had to be sworn it could be used in subsequent legal proceedings
relating to the underlying contract. It would make a beneficiary think twice before he claimed
the on-demand guarantee since most beneficiaries would hestiate to sign a declaration which is
manifestly untrue.

Id.
179 Id. at 284 (whether "the exporter can sell the idea of some documentation to accompany a
claim under the on-demand guarantee ... will depend on his bargaining skill...

180 See supra note 13.
181 Id

182 See Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. 159.
183 See White, supra note 2, at 131.
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Mareva injunctions be granted more readily."8 4 While it may seem inequitable that in many cases Middle Eastern buyers should be able to call
on demand bonds and bankers' guarantees successfully in situations
where extensive post-demand discovery might reveal fraud, it must be
remembered that the performance bond agreement is an enforceable contract which has been negotiated between the parties and is reflected in the
contract price.185 One might argue with some force that acknowledged
inequalities of bargaining power, the large sums at stake, and certain ethical and cultural considerations militate in favor of a policy of aggressive
intervention by the courts in suspect performance bond situations. English courts have resisted such an approach to date on the ground that
irrevocable letters of credit, demand performance bonds, and bank guarantees are the lifeblood of international commerce and that to interfere
unnecessarily might prove dangerous
to the continued use of such instru18 6
ments in international trade.
Performance bonds and bankers' guarantees, like irrevocable letters
of credit, play an important role in international trade, making possible
transactions and services that physical distance and cultural differences
might otherwise render impossible.187 Yet for the seller or contractor
who is a party to an international contract, demand bonds and bank
guarantees represent risks that must be accounted for whether through
sound commercial judgment, a higher contract price, insurance, or recourse to the courts. By requiring that a party seeking to enjoin payment
of a demand bond or bank guarantee provide clear proof that a demand
was fraudulent and that the bank knew it to be so, the English courts
have assured the continued use of such instruments in international
trade. The policy judgment the courts have made is that the usefulness
of performance bonds and bank guarantees in international trade outweighs any of the inequities which might accrue to individual traders
from the payment of such instruments in suspect but not necessarily
fraudulent circumstances.18 8 This approach implicitly recognizes the im184 But cf. supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. See also Barclay-Johnson,[1980] 1 W.L.R.
at 1266 (statement of Sir Robert Megarry, V.-C. regarding the granting of Mareva injunctions:
"[tihe court, like other human institutions, must at times take some risks; and in doing so, I think
that it should initially err on the side of conservation rather than dispersion.").
185 See Edward Owen, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 170 (statement of Lord Denning, M.R., that the "possibility [of a demand on the bond] is so real that the English supplier, if he is wise, will take it into
account when quoting his price for the contract.").
186 See supra note 15. See also Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of CreditLaw, 24 ARIz. L. REV.
239 (1982).
187 See White, supra note 2, at 121-22 (performance bonds bridge a "gap of distrust" between the
buyer and the seller in an international contract).
188 See supra note 15.
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portance of the sanctity of private contracts in an international setting.' 9
While there might be many persuasive reasons for lowering the standard
of proof of fraud and granting Mareva injunctions against performance
bonds and bank guarantees more readily, it is submitted that, in view of
the long-term interests of international trade, the approach taken by the
English courts is the correct one.
Peter S. O'Driscoll
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